![]() What is more, I claim that three key contextual variables modulate the connection between innate moral intuitions and the development of civilian protection norms: (1) societal interdependence (2) the dispersion of power in ways that increase the agency of potential non-combatants and (3) the creation of norms in argumentative contexts that require more impartial moral reasoning. More specifically, capacities for perspective-taking and empathy shape how people interpret the limits of their moral commitments, and when these capacities are engaged, intuitional heuristics affect how they judge the morality of killing in war. For IR theory, this raises an important puzzle: how can we explain why similar normative ideas emerged in human societies that are otherwise very different? Building on research in cognitive science, social psychology, and social neuroscience, I argue that most people have natural cognitive and emotional predispositions that bias the emergence and transmission of cultural norms that protect non-combatants. Drawing on historical evidence that shows that political actors in Ancient China and the early Islamic empire endorsed civilian protection rules, I claim that such norms are more common than most IR theorists suppose. Abstract: In contemporary political science, many believe that normative restrictions on armed conflict are an outgrowth of Western culture and the Judeo-Christian just war tradition. ![]()
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